UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE AT GREENEVILLE

FLORA BELLAMY)	
)	
v.)	NO. 2:03-CV-310
)	
NATIONAL TEXTILES, LLC)	
)	

ORDER

The plaintiff's complaint, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967, is before the Court to address a motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant. [Doc. 11]. Summary judgment is proper where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Inds. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The central issue is "whether the evidence presents sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a manner of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986); Vaughn v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 291 F. 3d 900, 903 (6th Cir. 2002).

The defendant submits that it is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiff's discrimination claims, insisting that the plaintiff cannot set forth a *prima facie* case of discrimination, in that she cannot establish an essential element of her claim that she was qualified for the job from which she was terminated, as required by the *McDonnell Douglas* analysis. *See Bush v. Dictaphone Corp.*, 161 F. 3d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1998). The defendant further argues that, even if the plaintiff could establish a *prima facie* case of discrimination, the defendant has submitted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination, which the plaintiff cannot rebut. *See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.*, 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, giving the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the Court finds that there is a material dispute of facts as to whether the plaintiff was qualified for her job from which she was terminated. The Court further finds that there is a material dispute of facts as to whether the legitimate non-discriminatory reason proffered by the defendant for the plaintiff's termination is merely pretext for a discriminatory reason. Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED** that the defendant's motion for summary judgment is **DENIED**. The Court further finds that, in light of the Court's holding, the plaintiff's objection to the defendant's summary judgment

reply is MOOT. [Doc. 20].

Pursuant to LR 16.4 of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee it is hereby **ORDERED** that this case proceed to mediation by April 15, 2005. The parties shall report on the results of the mediation on or before April 18, 2005.

ENTER:

<u>s/J. RONNIE GREER</u> UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE